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Abstract
Background: Neuraminidase inhibitors were used to reduce the transmission of pandemic influenza A/H1N1 2009 at the
early stages of the 2009/2010 pandemic. Policies for diagnosis of influenza for the purposes of antiviral intervention differed
markedly between and within countries, leading to differences in the timing and scale of antiviral usage.
Methodology/Principal Findings: The impact of the percentage of symptomatic infected individuals who were diagnosed,
and of delays to diagnosis, for three antiviral intervention strategies (each with and without school closure) were
determined using a simulation model of an Australian community. Epidemic characteristics were based on actual data from
the A/H1N1 2009 pandemic including reproduction number, serial interval and age-specific infection rate profile. In the
absence of intervention an illness attack rate (AR) of 24.5% was determined from an estimated R0 of 1.5; this was reduced to
21%, 16.5% or 13% by treatment-only, treatment plus household prophylaxis, or treatment plus household plus extended
prophylaxis antiviral interventions respectively, assuming that diagnosis occurred 24 hours after symptoms arose and that
50% of symptomatic cases were diagnosed. If diagnosis occurred without delay, ARs decreased to 17%, 12.2% or 8.8%
respectively. If 90% of symptomatic cases were diagnosed (with a 24 hour delay), ARs decreased to 17.8%, 11.1% and 7.6%,
respectively.
Conclusion: The ability to rapidly diagnose symptomatic cases and to diagnose a high proportion of cases was shown to
improve the effectiveness of all three antiviral strategies. For epidemics with R0,=1.5 our results suggest that when the
case diagnosis coverage exceeds ,70% the size of the antiviral stockpile required to implement the extended prophylactic
strategy decreases. The addition of at least four weeks of school closure was found to further reduce cumulative and peak
attack rates and the size of the required antiviral stockpile.
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Introduction
Treatment and prophylaxis with antiviral drugs is a core
strategy in the influenza pandemic preparedness plans of many
countries [1,2,3] and was utilized for the first time during the 2009
A/H1N1 pandemic [4].
The efficacy of antiviral drugs for treatment and prophylaxis has
been demonstrated in trials, as analysed in [5]. In addition to
reducing the severity and duration of symptoms [6], neuraminidase
inhibitors also reduce both infectiousness of treated individuals and
susceptibility of exposed individuals undergoing prophylaxis [5],
preventingsecondarytransmission and thus potentiallyreducingthe
impact of the epidemic. Modelling studies oriented to H5N1 have
been used to determine their effectiveness in reducing illness attack
rates; examples include reducing illness amongst health care
workers [7,8] and in the wider community [9,10,11,12,13].
We have expanded on previous modelling studies by simulating,
in detail, the effect of several key aspects of antiviral interventions.
These include the effect of delaying diagnosis and the ratio of diagnosed
to undiagnosed symptomatic cases, as well as the subsequent antiviral
treatment and (possible) prophylaxis. We simulated epidemics in a
community of 30,000 individuals, basing the characteristics of the
influenza strain on those of the 2009 pandemic as estimated from
actual pandemic data including reproduction number [14,15,16,
17,18], serial interval [14,15], and age-specific attack rate profile
[19].
The 2009 A/H1N1 pandemic revealed that strategies for using
antiviral drugs differed markedly between and within countries
[4]. One of these differences was whether antiviral drugs were used
solely for treatment or also for prophylaxis. Prophylaxis strategies
also differed in terms of the extent of the contact group at which
the prophylaxis was targeted; that is, whether it was household
members only or whether it was extended to include workplace or
school contacts. The decision to use antivirals in a prophylactic
capacity (and if so, how extensively) will clearly determine both the
population-level effect of the intervention and the magnitude of
the antiviral resources needed. We simulated three increasing
scales of antiviral usage: treatment only, treatment plus household
prophylaxis, and treatment plus household prophylaxis plus
prophylaxis of workplace or school class contacts.
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the methods used to determine who should receive treatment, and
as a consequence who should also receive prophylaxis. Some
countries (e.g. some states in Australia) initially required laboratory
testing before initiation of a treatment regime (and the possible
prophylaxis of a contact group), while others only required
diagnosis of an influenza-like illness (ILI) by a medical practitioner.
In other countries (e.g. the United Kingdom) diagnosis could be
conducted over the telephone by a health-care worker with
immediate authority for the prescription of antiviral drugs.
Assuming that infected individuals seek medical attention upon
the development of symptoms, the diagnosis procedure adopted is
a key determiner of the time delay between symptom onset and
initiation of treatment (and possible prophylaxis). Since viral
shedding in an infected person occurs around the time of peak
symptoms [20], diagnosis delay will strongly influence the
effectiveness of antivirals in interruption of transmission. We
simulated diagnosis delays ranging from immediate (less than
6 hours), which might be possible in the case of the telephone
system described above, to 48 hours after symptoms appearing,
which might be a plausible (though unlikely) turn-around time for
a heavily loaded testing laboratory.
In addition to variations in these operational aspects of antiviral
delivery, a key observation of the 2009 pandemic was the
difficultly in ascertaining all the cases, and therefore the proportion
of infected cases to which antiviral interventions were being
applied (which we refer to as the diagnosis coverage). We
simulated such diagnosis coverages ranging form 10% through
to 100%.
As school closures were a common adjunct to antiviral
intervention policies, we also simulated all antiviral interventions
with and without concurrent school closures.
In the case of a newly emerged and highly virulent influenza
strain, a key aim of public health policy will be to contain infection
spread – that is, reduce the rate of new infections to a very low
level – either to prevent an epidemic or to buy time for a vaccine
to be developed and distributed. Current pandemic planning calls
for antiviral drugs to be used as part of such a containment
response, so understanding the effects of operational issues
pertaining to planned antiviral interventions is vital. Our
simulation experiments allowed us to quantify reductions in the
overall illness attack rate and in the maximum daily case load
under a range of diagnosis delays and diagnosis coverages for both
treatment-only and treatment plus prophylaxis strategies. Detailed
examination of these factors also permits us to establish how these
two diagnosis criteria impact on the required size of an antiviral
stockpile.
Methods
Simulation Model
We used an individual-based model of a real community in
Western Australia (Albany) with a population of approximately
30,000 to simulate the dynamics of the 2009 influenza pandemic.
We used census, state and local government data to construct a
human contact network involving households, schools, childcare
centres, workplaces and a regional hospital. The simulation period
was divided into 12 hour day/night cycles; during each cycle the
nominal location of every person was determined, and individuals
occupying the same location were assumed to come into potential
infective contact. In addition, community interaction was
modelled by assuming that active individuals would contact other
active individuals each day, with contact being random but biased
towards contact between people with nearby home locations.
This model was previously developed to determine the
effectiveness of social distancing and vaccination measures for a
possible future H5N1 pandemic [21,22,23], and was subsequently
used to examine antiviral and school closure interventions that
were employed in the A/H1N1 2009 pandemic [13]. We have
further refined this model to include the ability to simulate
diagnosis delays and coverages, and to reflect the biology of the A/
H1N1 2009 influenza strain according to information available in
early 2010.
Transmission of infection between infectious and susceptible
individuals who came into infective contact was resolved
stochastically. The probability of transmission was calculated as
a function of the state of the infectious (Ii) and susceptible (Is)
individuals involved at the time of contact, as given by:
Ptransmission Ii,Is ðÞ ~b   Susc Is ðÞ   Trans Ii ðÞ  1{AVEs Is ðÞ ðÞ  
1{AVEi Ii ðÞ ðÞ
Each factor contributing to the transmission probability is
described below. The basic transmission probability (b), capturing
the infectivity of the virus strain, was chosen to give an unmitigated
epidemic with a reproduction number R0 of 1.5. We also
determined alternative basic transmission probabilities that gave
epidemics with R0 values of 1.2, 2.0 and 2.5 – the rationale for
selecting these values is presented in the Discussion section.
To achieve a realistic age specific infection rate, age-specific
susceptibility parameters (the function Susc appearing above) were
calibrated to achieve an age-specific attack rate similar to that of
the A/H1N1 2009 pandemic. This was achieved using the
following procedure. Using the age distribution of cases reported
to the EDCD [19] (based on European Union influenza
surveillance data for the period April to September 2009) and
the age demographics of the Albany model (which are similar to
those of Europe), we calculated an age-specific attack rate profile.
We then determined transmission probability susceptibility
parameter values (Susc) for each age group in order to give an
epidemic that matched this attack rate profile. The basic virus
transmission probability parameter was then adjusted (keeping
age-specific susceptibilities constant) to produce epidemics with
target reproduction numbers, as described above.
In order to determine if this assumption has an important
influence on the effectiveness of antiviral strategies, we repeated
our simulations with an alternative set of age-specific susceptibility
parameters that gave rise to age-specific attack rates similar to
those of seasonal influenza (parameters were calibrated to serologic
infection rates reported for H3N2 in 1977–1978 in Tecumseh,
Michigan [24]). The main difference between the two age-specific
attack rate profiles is the greater numbers of cases in the 12–24 age
group for A/H1N1 2009, but fewer cases in older age groups,
compared to seasonal influenza. The age-specific infection rate
profiles used to determine age-specific susceptibilities for the two
different assumptions are shown in Figure 1.
Infected individuals were fully infectious (i.e. Trans(Ii) =1.0)
from 36 hours after infection (when symptoms were deemed to
appear) to 84 hours after infection; and less (half) as infectious for
the rest of the infectivity period (i.e. Trans(Ii) =0.5), which began
12 hours after infection and finished 6 days after infection. This
timeline of the progression of individual infection (which we refer
to as the infectivity profile), in conjunction with other the simulation
parameters and the structure of mixing groups, results in a mean
serial interval of 2.3 days (standard deviation 1.6 days), which was
consistent with the A/H1N1 2009 pandemic as estimated in
[14,15]. The serial interval was calculated by determining the time
between the event when an individual became infected, and
Diagnosis for Antivirals
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averaged over all infected individuals during a simulation run.
The peaked infectivity profile described above is an approxi-
mation of the viral shedding distribution documented in [20]. In
order to examine the sensitivity of our results to this choice of
infectivity profile we conducted an analysis using 4 additional
alternative infectivity profiles. For each alternative infectivity
profile, a corresponding b (basic transmission probability) value
was determined so that the resulting no-intervention epidemics all
had an R0 value of 1.5, and the simulation experiment series was
repeated. The full details of the alternative infectivity profiles are
given in Supporting Information Text S1. Although there is
evidence that infectiousness (as well a susceptibility) is age-specific,
we have not included this effect in our model.
We assumed that 32% of infected adults (20% of children)
would experience asymptomatic infection [25], and that 50% of
symptomatic adults (90% of children) would isolate themselves in
their household for the duration of their infection. In the baseline
epidemic, this leads overall to 23% of infections being asymptom-
atic, which is consistent with an estimate for the 2009 A/H1N1
pandemic of 22% [26]. We assumed that an average of one new
infection per day was stochastically introduced into the population
during the whole period of the simulations.
As with earlier work other parameter values such as community
contact rates and school class sizes were selected to give plausible
values for in-household versus out-of-household transmission [21].
Antiviral Efficacy
We assumed that the probability of infection transmission
during an infectious contact was reduced by 66% if the infected
individual was undergoing antiviral treatment (i.e. AVEi(Ii) =0.66)
[5,27], and that treated individuals experienced a 1-day reduction
in illness duration [28]. During cycles in which antiviral treatment
is not in effect, which could be because no antiviral treatment
strategy was being simulated, or the individual was not
symptomatic, or was not diagnosed, or treatment had not yet
begun due to diagnosis delay, AVEi(Ii) was set to 0.
Note that in the case that an individual became infected while
undergoing antiviral prophylaxis but did not receive treatment,
either because they experienced asymptomatic infection, or
because they were not diagnosed (see Diagnosis Delay and
Coverage below), the same AVEi reduction in infectiousness was
applied during the prophylaxis period.
Similarly, the transmission probability was reduced by 85% if
the susceptible individual was undergoing antiviral prophylaxis
(i.e. AVEs(Is) =0.85) [6], and were 50% less likely to experience
symptomatic illness if they did become infected [28]. For
individuals not undergoing treatment or prophylaxis, the respec-
tive AVEi and AVEs parameters were set to 1.0.
We further examined the possibility that the efficacy of reducing
infectivity is dramatically reduced if treatment is delayed by
conducting a sensitivity analysis with the alternate assumption that
AVEi declined exponentially with the length of time between
symptoms developing and AV administration, with AVEi reduced
by one half for each 24 hour delay. Figures illustrating the action
of AVEi for various diagnosis delays are contained in Supporting
Information Text S1
Antiviral Strategies
We analysed three different antiviral intervention strategies that
were used (variously) in Australia, the United Kingdom and the
USA during the early stages of the 2009 influenza pandemic.
These strategies were:
1. Treatment-only (T): Diagnosed individuals received antiviral
drug treatment.
2. Household prophylaxis (T+H): Diagnosed individuals received
antiviral treatment and all household members were given
antiviral drugs for prophylaxis.
3. Extended prophylaxis (T+H+E): Here the prophylactic use of
antiviral drugs was extended to a wider group of contacts, with
prophylaxis given to class members (if the diagnosed person is
school pupil or teacher) or to workplace contacts (if the case
was diagnosed in a workplace location), in addition to their
household members.
Antiviral treatment involved diagnosed individuals receiving two
doses taken daily for 5 days; antiviral prophylaxis consisted of one
dose taken daily for 10 days.
Note that by ‘‘diagnosis’’ we do not necessarily mean laboratory
confirmed diagnosis; merely that an individual sought medical
attention and a decision to administer antivirals was made. Note
Figure 1. Age-specific infection rate profiles for seasonal and A/H1N1 2009 influenza used to calibrate age-specific susceptibility.
The proportion of each age group infected in a baseline (unmitigated) epidemic is shown for seasonal influenza and for A/H1N1 2009. In both cases
age demographics are those of the Albany model, and final infection rates are 17% (corresponding to a 13% final illness attack rate).
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0013797.g001
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who became infected (and was diagnosed) during prophylaxis
would switch to a new full-length antiviral treatment course. We
also assumed that a person would receive at most two prophylactic
courses; and that they would not receive prophylaxis if they had
previously experienced symptomatic infection.
School Closure
For each of these strategies, we simulated epidemics with and
without school closure (SC). We assumed that closure of each
school was triggered following diagnosis of two cases in the school,
whereupon the school was closed for two weeks, with each school
closing on at most two occasions for a maximum total of 4 weeks.
School closures were applied to primary and secondary schools but
not to childcare facilities or adult education institutions. We
assumed that teachers and pupils affected by school closure would
not attend their regular school hub during the daytime cycle but
instead dwelt at home, coming into contact with other individuals
present in the household. Individuals so affected were assumed to
make their usual community contacts at during the day, but made
no additional (compensatory) contacts.
Diagnosis Delay and Coverage
We simulated diagnosis coverages, that is, the percentage of those
who experience symptomatic infection who are actually diag-
nosed, ranging from 10% through to 100% in 10% increments.
We define the diagnosis delay to be the period from when an
individual firstexperiencessymptomsto the time when theyreceives
antivirals. We assumed that antiviral treatment or prophylaxis
began at the time diagnosis was made. We simulated diagnosis
delays ranging from immediate (less than 6 hours after the
appearance of symptoms) up to 48 hours, in 12 hour increments.
We assumed that the actual time of diagnosis relative to the time
of infection or symptom onset may be caused by a variety of
factors; delay in individuals seeking medical attention, access to
health care facilities, delay in laboratory diagnosis, or availability
of antiviral drugs.
Results
In the absence of interventions our simulated baseline epidemic
had an R0 of 1.5, a final attack rate (AR) of 24.5%, and a serial
interval of 2.32 days. Additional epidemic characteristics, and
characteristicsforalternatebaselineepidemicswithR0 valuesof1.2,
2.0, and 2.5 can be found in Supporting Information Table S1. The
rationale for selecting these values is presented in the Discussion
section. Results for all simulated epidemics were determined from
the average of 40 individual simulation runs, each with stochastic
choices made using a different random number sequence.
Several patterns of results held across all intervention scenarios.
Greater prophylactic use of antivirals always resulted in greater
reductions in AR: strategy T+H+E was better than T+H which in
turn was better than T (see Figure 2A and Figure 3A).
The pattern of peak daily incidence reductions was the same as
for final AR reductions, with daily incidence reductions being
proportionally larger than final AR reductions (see Figures 2B and
3B).
The addition of 4 weeks school closure to any antiviral strategy
consistently gave an additional decrease in antiviral usage, AR,
and peak daily incidence.
Impact of Diagnosis Delay
We simulated a range of diagnosis delays from zero to 48 hours,
assuming a 50% diagnosis coverage. Results for the three antiviral
drug strategies, with and without 4 weeks of school closure, are
shown in Figure 2. Figure 2A shows that delaying antiviral
treatment (and related prophylaxis if used) resulted in an
approximately linear increase in AR for all strategies.
For the best antiviral strategy (T+H+E) the AR ranged from
8.8% with prompt diagnosis (no delay between symptom
appearance and antiviral administration) to 15.4% with a 48 hour
delay; for the T strategy the AR increased from 17.4.0% to 22.4%
over the same range of delays.
Assuming zero-delay diagnosis, a further 3.9%, 3.5% or 2.1%
reduction inthe final attack rate resulted from the addition of 4 weeks
of school closure to the T, T+Ha n dT +H+E strategies respectively.
The additional reduction in attack rate due to school closure is very
similar for diagnosis delays ranging from 0 to 48 hours.
The peak daily incidence is also reduced by prompt usage of
antiviral drugs. If there is no delay between symptom appearance
and diagnosis the maximum number of symptomatic cases per day
is reduced by 46 (109 to 63), 76 (109 to 33) and 89 (109 to 20) per
10,000 population using the T, T+H and T+H+E strategies
respectively. The addition of school closure can avoid a further 34,
17 and 8 cases per 10,000 of the population respectively. If
antiviral treatment and prophylaxis were started 24 or 48 hours
post symptom appearance, all strategies are less effective in
reducing the peak daily incidence, with treatment-only being
affected most adversely, as shown Figure 2B. Figure 4 shows daily
incidence epidemic curves for various intervention strategies and
diagnosis delays. The characteristic ‘‘double hump’’ appearing in
the school closure epidemic curves is due to schools re-opening
after their maximum 4 weeks of school closure, and the subsequent
acceleration of the epidemic at that point. This indicates that the
school closure component of the modelled interventions could be
more effective if optimally timed (this phenomena is considered
further in the Discussion section).
Impact of Diagnosis Coverage
A range of diagnosis coverages for each of the three antiviral drug
strategies were analysed using a realistic diagnosis delay of 24 hours.
As might be expected, our results indicate that a higher casediagnosis
coverage will reduce the final illness attack rate and the peak daily
incidence, as shown in Figures 3A and 3B. With a minimum
diagnosis coverage of 10% none of the antiviral drug strategies can
contain the epidemic i.e. reduce the illness attack rate to less than
10% of the population. The final attack rates are 23.8%, 22.9% and
20.8% (compared to the unmitigated attack rate of 24.5%), and the
peak daily incidence rates are 104, 95 and 84 per 10,000 (compared
to the unmitigated value of 109) following administration of the T,
T+Ha n dT +H+E strategies respectively. With a 50% diagnosis
coverage the attack rates are 21.0% (down 3.5% from 24.5%), 16.5%
(down 8.1%) and 13.0% (down 16.4%) respectively. Adding school
closure reduced the attack rate further, to 17.1%, 13.0% and 10.7%
respectively, showing the benefit of this layered approach. Figure 5
shows daily incidence epidemic curves for various intervention
strategies and diagnosisdelays. Wesummarize the impact of different
diagnosis delays and diagnosis coverages on the overall illness attack
rate and the peak daily incidence in Table 1.
Impact on Required Number of Antiviral Courses
For all intervention scenarios we found that wider prophylactic
use of antivirals resulted in greater numbers of antiviral courses
used, with the T+H+E strategy using the most and T using the
least. We also found that the addition of school closure to any
strategy always resulted in the use of fewer courses.
Figure 2C shows that longer diagnosis delays resulted in greater
antiviral usage, with the effect being largest for the prophylaxis
Diagnosis for Antivirals
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antiviral courses ranged from 21.4% with zero delay to 33.3%
with a 48 hour delay; for the T+SC strategy the number of courses
required varied from 6.7% to 9.0% over the same range of delay.
As shown in Figure 3C, the effect of diagnosis coverage on the
required number of antiviral courses differed qualitatively between
the treatment-only and prophylaxis strategies. For T+SC the
number of doses required increases linearly with diagnosis
coverage, from 1.8% with a diagnosis coverage of 10% to
13.7% with a diagnosis coverage of 100%. For T+H+E+SC the
number of courses required increases rapidly to a peak of 30.1% at
a diagnosis coverage of 60%; beyond this diagnosis coverage
threshold the number of courses required falls, reaching 26.6% at
a diagnosis coverage of 100%. For T+H+SC the number of
required courses increases more slowly than T+H+E+SC but more
rapidly than T+SC, up to a plateau at a diagnosis coverage of
80%, with a fall from 19.6% at a diagnosis coverage of 80% to
17.7% at a diagnosis coverage of 100%.
Sensitivity to Reproduction Number
Our results reported above assume an influenza epidemic with a
basic reproduction number of 1.5. In order to determine the
sensitivity of these results to alternate R0 assumptions, we repeated
our analysis of the effect of diagnosis delays and coverages for
epidemics with R0 values of 1.2, 2.0 and 2.5. Results of these
simulations can be found in Supporting Information Figures S1
and Figure S2; we describe the most significant outcomes below.
As might be expected, higher R0 values resulted in higher attack
rates and less effective antiviral interventions in proportion to
attack rate. Table 2 shows the outcome of each antiviral
intervention strategy (with and without school closure) for a range
of R0 values. These results assume a diagnosis delay of 24 hours
and a diagnosis coverage of 50%. For all strategies, increasing R0
causes higher final attack rates, higher peak daily incidence and
increased antiviral use.
We found that in terms of diagnosis delay, epidemics of all
reproduction numbers followed the same pattern: lowest attack rates
and antiviral usage occurred with zero delay, and attack rates and
antiviral usage increased essentially linearly with diagnosis delay, up
to 48 hours delay. The actual sensitivity to diagnosis delays (that is,
the degree to which antiviral effectiveness degraded with increasing
delay) depended upon the strategy and R0. The degradation in final
attacks is shown in Table 3; values ranged from 0.49–1.67 percent
per 12 hours delay. Wefound that for R0.=2.0,the antiviral usage
became insensitive to the diagnosis delay.
We also found that for the alternate R0 scenarios the final attack
rates and peak daily incidence varied according to diagnosis
coverages in a pattern similar to the R0=1.5 results.
Figure 2. Outcome of six antiviral intervention strategies as a function of diagnosis delay. Three outcomes are reported: (A) cumulative
illness attack rate, (B) peak daily incidence (per 10,000 population), and (C) number of antiviral courses used as a percentage of the population size.
We assumed that antiviral treatment or prophylaxis began at the time diagnosis was made and that 50% of symptomatic cases would be diagnosed.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0013797.g002
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with a high degree of certainty, one important statistic is an upper
bound on the number of antiviral courses needed to implement a
particular intervention strategy. Table 4 gives, for each R0 value
simulated,the maximum antiviral stockpileneeded over all diagnosis
coverages, and also the diagnosis coverage for which the maximum
occurs. It can be seen that for the treatment-only intervention, or for
R0 .=2.0, maximum antiviral usage occurs for a diagnosis
coverage of 100% (i.e. increasing diagnosis coverage always require
more antivirals); but for prophylaxis strategies at lower R0 values
maximum antiviral usage plateaus at an intermediate value.
Sensitivity to Age-Specific Attack Rate
As described in the Methods section above, we assumed that the
individual age-specific susceptibility to infection was related to the
age-specific attack rate (ASAR) of a baseline (unmitigated)
epidemic as observed with the 2009 pandemic. In order to
determine the effect of this assumption on the effectiveness of
antiviral strategies, we repeated our simulations with an alternative
set of parameters that gave rise to ASARs similar to those of
seasonal influenza [24].
Antiviral diagnosis delay and coverage results based on the
seasonal influenza age-specific attack rate assumption can be found
in Supporting Information Table S2. Quantitatively, we found that
the seasonal ASAR gave higher attack rates than the A/H1N1 2009
ASAR. For example, with R0=1.5 the baseline (no intervention)
final attack rate was 32.5% and the peak daily incidence was 121
per 10,000 compared to 24.5% and 109 per 10,000 for the latter.
Although the baseline attack rates were higher, antiviral interven-
tions gave higher proportional reductions for the seasonal ASAR
assumption. In some cases the prophylaxis strategies reduced attack
rates to a level lower than for the A/H1N12009 ASAR assumption,
despite starting from a higher baseline.
Qualitatively, the effects of antiviral interventions and sensitivity
to diagnosis delays and coverages were similar between the two
ASAR assumptions: increasing diagnosis delays and diagnosis
coverages led to the same patterns of increase in final attack rates,
peak daily incidence and antiviral usage.
Sensitivity to Reduced AVEi Due to Delayed Treatment
An assumption that AVEi is dramatically reduced as a
consequence of delayed treatment resulted in only a small
additional loss of antiviral effectiveness; approximately 1%
increase in the final attack rate. For example, the T+H+E strategy
gives a final attack rate of 8.8% assuming the ideal case of there
being no delay between symptoms and antiviral treatment.
Figure 3. Outcome of six antiviral intervention strategies as a function of diagnosis coverage. Three outcomes are reported: (A)
cumulative illness attack rate, (B) peak daily incidence (per 10,000 population), and (C) number of antiviral courses used as a percentage of the
population size. We simulated percentages of symptomatic individuals being diagnosed ranging from 10% to 100% in 10% increments. We assumed
that the delay between symptoms appearing and antiviral treatment or treatment plus prophylaxis was 24 hours.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0013797.g003
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attack rates of 13.0% and 15.4% respectively; if AVEi is assumed
to halve in efficacy with every additional 24 hour delay, the
corresponding final attack rates are 14.0% and 16.1% respectively.
Full results of the diagnosis delay experiments with the declining
AVEi assumption are given in Support Information Text S1.
Sensitivity to Infectivity Curve and Serial Interval
We conducted an analysis to determine the sensitivity of our
results to the individual infectivity profile – that is, the degree to
which an infected individual is infectious as a function of time since
infection – by repeating our experiments with 4 additional
alternative infectivity profiles. Here we report on the results for an
alternative infectivity profile that differs from that used in the main
results inthat the periodofmaximuminfectivityisearlier(beginning
24 ratherthan 36 hours afterinfection) andbriefer (lasting 36 rather
than 48 hours), and for which the maximum level of infectivity is
higher relative to the level of infectivity assumed for asymptomatic
or post peak infection (being 4 times higher rather than twice as
high). Full details and simulation results for all alternative infectivity
profiles are reported in Supporting Information Text S1.
The epidemic outcomes for the alternative, more peaked (i.e.
having higher hurtosis) infectivity profile exhibited three notable
features that contrasted with that of the original infectivity profile.
Firstly the peaked infectivity profile resulted in a shorter serial
interval of 1.85 days (standard deviation 0.762 days), compared to
2.31 days (standard deviation 2.88 days) for the original infectivity
profile.
Secondly, although parameters for both infectivity profiles were
calibrated to give unmitigated epidemics with an R0 of 1.5, the
final attack rate for the peaked infectivity profile was lower (21.3%)
than for the original profile (24.5%).
Thirdly, the peaked infectivity profiles result in greater
sensitivity to delay in antiviral treatment, particularly over the
first 12 hours after symptom appearance. For example, for the
T+H antiviral strategy with the peaked infectivity profile, diagnosis
delays of 0, 12 or 24 hours resulted in final attack rates of 6.9%,
11.7% or 13.3%, compared to 12.2%, 14.1% or 16.5% for the
same delays for the original profile.
Discussion
Neuraminidase inhibitors were used in the context of an
influenza pandemic for the first time in 2009. Prompted by the
observation that a variety of different criteria for distributing
antivirals were used in different countries and at different times
[4], we evaluated the impact on attack rate reductions arising from
delays to diagnosis, and hence the initiation of antiviral use for
both treatment and prophylaxis. We also evaluated the impact of
Figure 4. Daily incidence epidemic curves for various delays in antiviral treatment and/or prophylaxis. Interventions are abbreviated as
follows: treatment only (T), household prophylaxis (H), extended prophylaxis (E), 4 weeks school closure (SC). We assumed that 50% of symptomatic
cases would be diagnosed. Schools were assumed to close upon the diagnosis of 3 cases in the school for a period of two weeks. Each school closed
a maximum of 2 times for a total of 4 weeks.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0013797.g004
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diagnosed, the diagnosis coverage. Use of actual data from the
2009 pandemic allowed us to investigate these operational details
of antiviral interventions in the context of simulated epidemics that
matched the A/H1N1 2009 pandemic strain in terms of
reproduction number, serial interval and age-specific attack rate
profile. We also simulated all antiviral interventions with and
without concurrent school closure, as the combination of school
Figure 5. Daily incidence epidemic curves for various diagnosis coverages. Interventions are abbreviated as follows: treatment only (T),
household prophylaxis (H), extended prophylaxis (E), 4 weeks school closure (SC). We assumed that the delay between symptoms appearing and
antiviral treatment or treatment plus prophylaxis was 24 hours. Schools were assumed to close upon the diagnosis of 3 cases in the school for a
period of two weeks. Each school closed a maximum of 2 times for a total of 4 weeks.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0013797.g005
Table 1. Outcome of antiviral epidemic measures with various diagnosis delays and coverages.
final symptomatic attack rate (%) peak daily incidence (per 10,000)
baseline 24.5 109
intervention strategy diagnosis delay diagnosis coverage diagnosis delay diagnosis coverage
0 h 24 h 48 h 10% 50% 90% 0 h 24 h 48 h 10% 50% 90%
T 17.4 21.0 22.4 23.8 21.0 17.8 63 84 96 104 84 68
T+SC 13.6 17.1 18.2 18.4 17.1 14.5 29 39 41 48 39 35
T+H 12.2 16.5 18.4 22.9 16.5 11.1 33 56 69 95 56 30
T+H+SC 8.7 13.0 15.0 17.6 13.0 7.8 16 27 31 43 27 15
T+H+E 8.8 13.0 15.4 20.8 13.0 7.6 20 34 47 84 34 17
T+H+E+SC 6.7 10.7 13.4 16.8 10.7 6.1 12 19 26 39 19 12
Final symptomatic attack rate (as % of population) and peak daily symptomatic incidence (per 10,000) are given for different intervention strategies, diagnosis delays
and diagnosis coverages. Intervention strategies are abbreviated as follows: T – antiviral treatment of diagnosed cases, H – prophylaxis of household of diagnosed cases,
E – prophylaxis of school or work contacts of diagnosed cases, SC – four weeks of school closure. Where diagnosis delay differs from 24 hours, diagnosis coverage is
50%; where diagnosis coverage differs from 50%, diagnosis delay is 24 hours.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0013797.t001
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pandemic and would undoubtedly be used in the future upon the
occurrence of a more pathogenic influenza pandemic.
Delaying administration of antiviral treatment and prophylaxis
is predicted to result in higher AR and require a larger stockpile of
antiviral drugs. Evidence shows that viral shedding (presumed to
correlate with infectivity) peaks shortly after the peak in symptoms
[20]; delay between symptoms appearing and the beginning of
antiviral treatment and prophylaxis thus coincides this period of
maximum infectivity. Our results show that a slower, more
accurate diagnosis procedure, such as PCR testing, that can
distinguish pandemic influenza from other influenza-like illnesses
(ILI) is not guaranteed to make better use of an antiviral stockpile;
this depends on both the rapidity of diagnosis (the effect of which
we quantify) and the prevalence of non-pandemic influenza ILI.
The influence of antivirals prescribed for false-positive ILI
diagnosis is not simple to predict. Such antiviral usage may have
a prophylactic effect, protecting against co-infection with pan-
demic influenza. If the ILI causing false-positive diagnosis is
another influenza strain, antiviral usage may influence the
dynamics of this non-pandemic influenza, changing the prevalence
of non-pandemic ILI.
An additional point is that while treatment (and possibly
household prophylaxis) may be possible via a rapid-diagnosis
scheme, this is not the case for extended prophylaxis where contact
tracing is necessary: even if contact tracing were to be initiated
immediately on symptom appearance, there might be a 24- or 48-
hour delay in finding and distributing antivirals to school or
workplace contacts. However, since our results show that extended
prophylaxis is more effective than treatment-only by a consider-
able margin, adding prophylaxis, even if delayed, should
substantially improve the outcome.
The proportion of symptomatic individuals diagnosed strongly
impacts the effectiveness of all strategies. We found that increasing
the diagnosis coverage resulted in essentially linear corresponding
decreases in the final attack rate. Large decreases in peak daily
incidence were possible by relatively small increases in diagnosis
coverage from 10%: halving the no-intervention peak daily
incidence (from 109 per 10,000) could be achieved by diagnosis
coverages of 50% or 30% from the household and extended
prophylaxis strategies respectively. Adding 4 weeks of school
closure resulted in a further halving. The scale of antiviral courses
required for these scenarios would preclude using the extended
strategy with a high diagnosis coverage for all but those countries
with very large antiviral stockpiles, but the potential reduction
achieved is considerable.
Estimating diagnosis coverage is difficult, requiring both
information on the prevalence (obtained for example through
serological surveys) and statistics on clinical diagnosis for the same
population. Perhaps due to the mild nature of the 2009 pandemic,
diagnosis coverage estimates that have been made are of the order
of 5%–10% [29,30], and are thus at the lower end of the range
simulated in this study. However, a pandemic perceived to be
more deadly might result in a higher diagnosis coverage,
motivating our choice of 50% for a baseline intervention value.
The sensitivity of the stockpile size to diagnosis coverage differs
qualitatively between the treatment-only and the prophylactic
strategies. At R0,=1.5 increasing the diagnosis coverage beyond
these thresholds results in fewer antiviral courses being required.
This occurs because at these high diagnosis levels, the prophylaxis
strategies suppress infection spread to such an extent that the
entire scale of the local epidemic is reduced, consequently
requiring fewer, overall antiviral courses. An important caveat is
that this applies to epidemics with R0=1.5; for R0 .=2.0, the
required size of the antiviral stockpile increases continuously with
an increasing diagnosis coverage.
We also show that school closure is an effective adjunct to all
antiviral strategies, reducing final attack rates, peak daily case
loads and the number of antiviral courses required. Prior studies
[13,21,22] with this model indicate that extending school closure
periods is increasingly effective, so we may surmise that concurrent
school closure periods longer than 4 weeks will be more effective
when coupled with an antiviral mitigation strategy. We also note
our simulated school closures were not optimally timed – Figures 4
and 5 show a characteristic ‘‘double hump’’ in the epidemic curve,
which is a due to schools re-opening after 4 weeks of closure and
the epidemic consequently accelerating at that point. We assumed
that schools would close upon 3 cases were diagnosed in the
school; whereas the time or triggering condition that gives the
largest reduction in attack rate depends on the transmissibility of
the epidemic and the duration of school closure [31]. A previous
study using the same simulation model examined the sensitivity of
the effectiveness of school closure to various alternative modelling
assumptions ([21], Supporting Information).
Table 2. Outcome of antiviral epidemic measures for
epidemics with various reproduction numbers
R0
intervention strategy 1.2 1.5 2.0 2.5
cumulative attack rate (%)
baseline 12.8 24.5 36.4 43.8
T 8.9 21.0 33.6 41.5
T + SC 5.9 17.1 27.9 36.3
T + H 5.8 16.5 28.6 36.0
T + H + SC 4.1 13.0 23.9 31.3
T + H + E 4.6 13.0 24.4 31.6
T + H + E + SC 3.5 10.7 22.6 29.8
peak daily incidence (per 10,000)
baseline 33 109 274 450
T 2 08 42 4 8 4 3 0
T + SC 11 39 107 235
T + H 1 35 61 9 5 3 6 7
T + H + S C 8 2 78 11 9 1
T + H + E 9 34 123 259
T + H + E + S C 7 1 96 21 4 0
antiviral usage (number of courses used as % of population)
baseline 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
T 4.4 10.5 16.8 20.7
T + SC 2.9 8.5 13.9 18.1
T + H 8.5 22.5 34.5 39.7
T + H + SC 6.0 17.7 28.7 34.3
T + H + E 15.3 33.4 47.1 52.7
T + H + E + SC 11.9 29.2 46.4 52.9
Cumulative attack rates (as % of population), peak daily incidences (per 10,000)
and number of antiviral courses used (as a % of population size) are given for
different intervention strategies and for baseline (i.e. unmitigated) epidemics
with four different reproduction numbers (R0). Intervention strategies are
abbreviated as follows: T – antiviral treatment of diagnosed cases, H –
prophylaxis of household of diagnosed cases, E – prophylaxis of school or work
contacts of diagnosed cases, SC – four weeks of school closure. In all cases
diagnosis coverage is 50% and diagnosis delay is 24 hours.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0013797.t002
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estimate at the outset of an epidemic as it can vary from strain to
strain, and from population to population for the same strain [32].
In order to determine the sensitivity of our results to variation in
R0, we repeated our simulation experiments for epidemics with R0
values of 1.2, 1.5, 2.0 and 2.5. We chose to report results for
R0=1.5 (giving a final symptomatic attack rate of 24.5%) in the
main paper as our baseline value as this value lies within the range
first estimated for the 2009 pandemic from Mexico outbreak data
(1.4–1.6) [14] and also within the wider range of subsequent
estimates which have ranged from 1.2 to 2.1 [15,16,17,18].
We assumed that differential susceptibility to infection among
age groups would lead to age-specific attack rates similar to those
of the 2009 pandemic, which differed from seasonal influenza
(which it was similar to in many other respects) in that the it
exhibited a greater numbers of cases in the 12–24 age group but
fewer cases in older age groups [19]. In order to determine the
sensitivity of our results to the assumption of 2009-like age-specific
attack rate, we repeated our simulation experiments assuming that
age-specific susceptibilities were similar to seasonal influenza.
There is also the possibility, not included in our model, that
infectiousness as well as susceptibility is age-dependant, with
children being more infectious than adults. If this is the case then
school closure is likely to be more effective than our results
indicate.
We found that compared to epidemics with age-specific
susceptibilities based on seasonal influenza, the baseline simulated
2009 epidemics exhibited a lower attack rate and lower peak daily
incidence; however, proportional reduction in attack rates achieved
by antiviral interventions were also lower. This indicates that the
effectiveness of antiviral interventions may be overestimated if
modelling is based on seasonal influenza data. We attribute lower
attack rate (compared to seasonal influenza with the same R0)t o
the existence of a subpopulation (the 12–24 age groups) that had a
much higher individual susceptibility to infection but who mixed
disproportionately with themselves, compared to the larger
Table 3. Degradation in antiviral effectiveness due to diagnosis delay for epidemics with various reproduction numbers.
R0
1.2 1.5 2.0 2.5
intervention
strategy
zero-delay
attack rate
(%)
attack rate
increase (% per
12 hours delay)
zero-delay
attack rate
(%)
attack rate
increase (% per
12 hours delay)
zero-delay
attack rate
(%)
attack rate
increase (% per
12 hours delay)
zero-delay
attack rate
(%)
attack rate
increase (% per
12 hours delay)
baseline 12.8 24.5 36.4 43.8
T 6.2 1.06 17.4 1.23 31.0 0.93 39.2 0.78
T+SC 4.0 0.81 13.6 1.16 25.5 0.83 33.3 1.04
T+H 3.6 0.97 12.2 1.55 25.0 1.39 32.4 1.46
T+H+SC 2.8 0.54 8.7 1.57 21.5 1.04 28.2 1.34
T+H+E 2.8 0.73 8.8 1.65 20.9 1.33 28.7 1.18
T+H+E+SC 2.4 0.49 6.7 1.67 19.1 1.27 27.1 1.02
Cumulative attack rates (% of population) are given for zero diagnosis delay (i.e. administration of antivirals at the time of symptom appearance) along with the
approximate increase in final attack rate that results from each addition 12 hour delay (up to 48 hours). Results are given for different intervention strategies and for
baseline (i.e. unmitigated) epidemics with four different reproduction numbers (R0). Intervention strategies are abbreviated as follows: T – antiviral treatment of
diagnosed cases, H – prophylaxis of household of diagnosed cases, E – prophylaxis of school or work contacts of diagnosed cases, SC – four weeks of school closure. In
all cases diagnosis coverage is 50%.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0013797.t003
Table 4. Maximum antiviral usage for epidemics with various reproduction numbers
R0
1.2 1.5 2.0 2.5
Intervention
strategy
max AV
usage (%)
diagnosis
coverage (%)
max AV
usage (%)
diagnosis
coverage (%)
max AV
usage (%)
diagnosis
coverage (%)
max AV
usage (%)
diagnosis
coverage (%)
T 5.6 90 17.1 100 30.7 100 38.8 100
T+SC 4.2 100 13.7 100 25.1 100 32.8 100
T+H 8.7 70 25.8 90 50.3 100 61.6 100
T+H+SC 6.2 90 19.6 80 42.4 100 51.3 100
T+H+E 15.3 50 35.3 70 60.0 100 71.6 100
T+H+E+SC 12.6 80 30.1 60 58.2 100 72.8 100
Maximum number of antiviral course used (as a % of population size) is given along with the diagnosis coverage that gave rise to that maximum. Results are given for
different intervention strategies and for baseline (i.e. unmitigated) epidemics with four different reproduction numbers (R0). Intervention strategies are abbreviated as
follows: T – antiviral treatment of diagnosed cases, H – prophylaxis of household of diagnosed cases, E – prophylaxis of school or work contacts of diagnosed cases, SC –
four weeks of school closure. In all cases diagnosis delay was 24 hours.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0013797.t004
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was very similar however, with the effects of antiviral strategies,
diagnosis delays and diagnosis coverage following the same pattern
in both cases.
Our model of antiviral effectiveness assumed that antiviral
effectiveness in reducing infectivity (AVEi) was constant regardless
of when antiviral treatment was initiated. This is possibly too
simplistic; it might be the case that antiviral effectiveness declines
rapidly as infection develops within the infected individual. We
examined an alternative assumption that AVEi drops rapidly with
treatment delay, halving with each additional 24 hour delay. We
found that under this assumption the additional decline in
effectiveness of antiviral treatment strategies due to treatment
delay was small. It appears that most of the reduction in
effectiveness due to treatment delay is simply due to the fact that
a proportion of an infected individual’s infective duration goes
untreated, and that this period, just after symptom appearance, is
when many transmission events are concentrated, due to this being
a period of high infectivity. Assuming that delayed treatment also
resulted in lower AVEi once treatment was initiated did result in a
higher attack rate compared to the assumption of constant AVEi,
but this effect was small compared to the effect described above.
Given that antiviral delayed usage results in a smaller effect per
course of drugs, an alternative strategy to make use of limited
antiviral resources might be to limit antiviral usage to individuals
who are either suffering serious complications or seek medical
attention immediately on developing symptoms. The current study
cannot quantitatively assess this strategy; and since this strategy
would require rapid diagnosis the effect of false-positive diagnoses
would need to be taken into account.
Another factor that may strongly influence the effectiveness of
antiviral strategies is how the infectiousness of an individual
changes over time. Our sensitivity analysis demonstrated that if the
infectivity profile is sharply peaked around the time of symptom
development (and drops off rapidly afterwards), delays in the
administration of antivirals are even more detrimental.
Other influenza simulation studies have used a similarly peaked
infectivity profile [9,33]. This profile matches the viral shedding
profile data reported in the literature [20,34], if it is assumed that
infectivity is linearly proportional to the measured viral titre. The
peaked infectivity profile assumption results in a short serial
interval of 1.85 days, compared to 2.32 days for our original less
peaked (i.e. having lower kurtosis) infectivity profile. Serial interval
estimates for A/H1N1 2009 influenza range from 1.91 [14,15] to
2.9 [15], so it is difficult to determine from serial interval data
which is more appropriate.
Related Work
Previous simulation studies have modelled antiviral mitigation
strategies, primarily in an H5N1 context [9,10,11,35,36,37,38,39].
Some of these studies have examined the effect of delays to, and
the proportion of cases receiving, antivirals; none have specifically
modelled epidemics with characteristics based on data from the A/
H1N1 2009 pandemic.
As with our study, that reported in (Ferguson et al. 2006) for a
similar reproduction number also indicates that both delaying
treatment and treating a smaller proportion of cases increases the
cumulative attack rate, the maximum daily incidence and the
number of antiviral courses required. Additionally, we have
quantified this result for in two further antiviral strategies and for a
wider range of R0 values.
The modelling study reported in [12] examined several
logistical constraints on antiviral usage in an influenza pandemic,
including the proportion of infected individuals who were treated.
Although different modelling assumptions make comparison
difficult, a common finding was that for an epidemic with an R0
of 1.5, maximum antiviral usage occurs when approximately 50%
of cases are diagnosed. Additional results from our study also
indicates that this phenomenon is no longer true as R0 increases:
for R0 approximately $2.0 increasing diagnosis coverage always
leads to increased antiviral usage.
A simulation study that assessed the importance of fast test kits,
which would allow diagnosis in one hour as opposed to 12 hours,
found that delays in this range were less important than the choice
of strategy (e.g. treatment compared to treatment plus prophylax-
is), which is consistent with our results [40].
In the study reported in [10] the effect of delaying diagnosis and
thus application of antiviral medication an additional day (from 24
to 48 hours) for a combined treatment and extended prophylaxis
strategy is also shown to increase both the attack rate and the
number of antiviral courses required. This study found that a
24 hour delay assuming a 50% false-positive diagnosis coverage
was superior to a 48 hour delay with no false positives. However
these results indicate very small resulting attack rates following
activation of the antiviral measures, for example reducing the
unmitigated cumulative attack rate from 32.6% to between 3.7%
and less than 1% for a range of treatment and targeted antiviral
strategies, for a reproduction number comparable to that used
here. Given the resulting attack rates are perhaps unrealistically
small, the effect of delaying antiviral intervention may be more
marked than that determined here.
The results presented here are subject to several limitations. We
have assumed that the pandemic influenza strain is susceptible to
neuraminidase inhibitors and have not attempted to model the
effects of antiviral resistance. We have not modelled the potential
which antiviral drugs have to reduce or prevent occurrence of
serious adverse infection outcomes, which may well make antiviral
treatment a worthwhile strategy even in scenarios where only a
small stockpile is available or where only small numbers of (serious)
cases are diagnosed. Also, our simulated population has demo-
graphic, mobility and contact patterns typical of an industralised
country setting and may not be applicable to other populations.
Conclusion
Our evaluation of antiviral drug interventions using a detailed
simulation model shows that their effectiveness, and the required
antiviral stockpile size, is strongly dependent on (i) the delay
occurring between symptom onset and diagnosis, and (ii) the
percentage of the infected population being diagnosed, and
consequentially benefiting from antiviral administration.
How do the results presented here relate to the actual antiviral
interventions implemented during the 2009 A/H1N1 pandemic?
Procedures for diagnosing pandemic influenza for the purposes of
antivirial treatment or prophylaxis varied considerably between
and within countries, and varied according to the stage of the
epidemic; however some general conclusions can be drawn.
Evidence suggests that due to the mild nature of the symptoms
of the A/H1N1 2009 virus, the proportion of infected people
seeking medical attention was low, perhaps on the order of 5%–
10% [29,30]. While antiviral drugs have the potential to reduce or
prevent occurrence of serious adverse infection outcomes for
treated individuals, our results show that at this low level of
diagnosis antivirals have essentially no population-level effect in
reducing overall transmission.
Secondly, amongst pandemic plans that called for laboratory
testing of suspected cases, a 48-hour turn-around time for testing
was anticipated [1], and the experience during 2009 was that
average turn-around times were in fact 48-hours or longer (this
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results show that if diagnosis on this timescale is used for the
prescription of antivirals for treatment or prophylaxis, their
effectiveness is greatly diminished. An alternative diagnosis policy
of prescription upon presentation with influenza-like illness (ILI)
symptoms would thus improve antiviral effectiveness, but at the
risk of higher antiviral usage due to distribution of antivirals for
non-influenza ILI.
While the 2009 A/H1N1 pandemic strain has been character-
ized as mild, our results are equally applicable to a more
pathogenic pandemic having similar transmissibility (R0=1.5). In
the case of the emergence of such a virulent strain, it is anticipated
that antivirals would be employed on a large scale as part of an
effort to contain infection spread.
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